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INTRODUCTION
Medical care is a risky business. Health care providers risk their
reputations and malpractice suits, but patients run the principal risks,
namely that medical care may fail to achieve the expected improvement
or may cause some new harm. Some risk is of course inescapable
because it is inherent in the very nature of the medical enterprise-
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that enterprise being the attempt to alter already present hazards of
undesirable outcomes by sometimes drastic means whose effectiveness
and safety are often uncertain. But health care providers, by providing
additional services or by taking further precautions, can frequently
avoid or reduce many, perhaps most, medical hazards-although at
some cost in resources and in new risks created.
Not all avoidable risks should be avoided, however, since many
are very unlikely either to occur or to cause significant harm, and the
resources that would be consumed to avoid them always have valuable
applications elsewhere. Individuals and society must somehow decide
how much medical risk reduction is appropriate, given the alternatives,
their costs, and the relative values of the expected outcomes. The law
of medical malpractice exerts a large and apparently growing influence
on the risk reduction actually undertaken by medical care providers.
One kind of provider, the Health Maintenance Organization, or
HMO,' is especially well suited to weigh all relevant factors in deciding
how, and how much, to reduce the medical risks faced by its enrollee-
patients. HMOs' distinguishing characteristic is that they undertake to
provide all the medical care their enrollees need in exchange for fixed,
advance capitation payments. Precisely because they must provide
comprehensive care from an inelastic pool of resources, IMOs are well
motivated to scrutinize the effectiveness of every risk-reducing measure
they might take. Moreover, because their responsibility for care is
comprehensive and because their organization usually allows them to
provide more integrated services than most other providers, HMOs are
well situated to compare each possible risk reduction with other uses
of the available resources and to choose the most productive course of
action.
In these respects, IMOs stand in distinct contrast with the
dominant mode of American medical practice, fee-for-service, wherein
patients (or governmental or private financing mechanisms) pay for
each service rendered by a variety of independent providers (doctors,
1. The term "HMO" was coined by Dr. Paul Ellwood, Jr., and his colleagues at the
Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies (InterStudy) in Minneapolis and adopted by the
Nixon Administration for several policy proposals. See, e.g., Ellwood, Anderson,
Billings, et al., Health Maintenance Strategy, 9 MED. CARE 291 (1971). InterStudy's
definition ensures that HMOs will have the risk-evaluation incentives discussed here.
An HMO is an organization in which the HMO itself and/or participating
physicians accept contractual responsibility to assure the delivery of a stated
range of health services, including at least ambulatory and in-hospital care to
a voluntarily enrolled population in exchange for an advance capitation pay-
ment (and assumes at least part of the financial risk and/or shares in the
surplus for the delivery of ambulatory and hospital services). HEALTH SERV-
ICES INFORMATION, Oct. 20, 1975, at 2.
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hospitals, and so on). Unlike HMOs, fee-for-service providers have
only weak financial incentives to weigh costs in evaluating possible risk-
reducing measures, since neither they nor their patients are able to
apply insurance money saved in one area to other, more productive
uses. Nor does the fee-for-service providers' organization usually
enable them to compare directly the value of a wide range of different
health-promoting services and to implement their evaluations in prac-
tice.
How medical care providers approach risk-reduction decisions is
very important in understanding the law of medical malpractice. Mal-
practice law does not purport independently to assess the reasonable-
ness of risky behavior in order to determine the optimal levels of risk
avoidance and risk acceptance, but instead enforces a standard of care
derived almost entirely from the customary practice of providers them-
selves. In drawing its standard of care from the usages of the medical
services market, the law may inadvertently perpetuate or exacerbate
the deficiencies of that market in assessing the appropriate level of
expenditures on risk reduction.
Although in a perfect world such customary practice might accept-
ably approximate the social optimum by aggregating the risk-assessing
wisdom of informed individuals, in reality malfunctions of the market-
place for medical services may make this standard socially inappropriate
as a guide to proper practice. Whereas the legal standard made sense
when providers or their paying patients regularly had to assess risk-
reducing measures in terms of their costs and the value of results
achieved in establishing patterns of conduct, the customary practice
standard of care has become increasingly inappropriate as third-party
payment has subtly changed medical practice by gradually eroding the
system's cost-consciousness. The apparent result has been a contem-
porary standard of care that exposes to substantial legal risks any pro-
vider who fails to imitate existing patterns of care, thus aggravating an
already serious tendency of medical care providers to adopt even more
procedures without careful consideration of the expense and results
involved. Many providers, indeed, are said to practice "defensive"
medicine in response to this perceived legal threat, performing extra
tests and taking additional precautions prompted more by legal fears
than by medical expectations.
This Article deals with the specific problem that legal enforcement
of customary practice standards derived from fee-for-service norms may
discourage innovative HMO practice based upon a different and
possibly more accurate evaluation of the costs or risks involved or em-
1377Vol. 1975:13751
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
ploying a different method of achieving similar risk reduction. Such
a push to HMO conformity may in turn eliminate the healthy economic
and philosophic competition between different medical approaches
which might otherwise develop between HMO and fee-for-service pro-
viders. Related problems of the medical custom standard include un-
due judicial concentration on determining what medical methods are
customary, to the exclusion of judging the risk reduction and re-
sults actually achieved; excessive penalties for noncomformity alone,
without regard to comparative costs and results; and inappropriate
consideration of medical risk reduction problems in isolation from one
another. These shortcomings not only pose malpractice problems for
HMOs but also show how difficult it is-especially within the con-
fines of the current legal approach to medical injuries-to weigh all
relevant considerations in attempting to determine the socially optimal
level of medical risk reduction.
THE APPLICATION OF MALPRACTICE LAW TO HMO CARE
A. HMOs' Structure, Incentives, and Contribution to Health Care
Delivery
Because HMOs must finance all needed care from the limited
budget supplied by enrollee capitation payments,2 they are highly moti-
vated to count costs, as well as risks and results, in deciding what care
to provide. 3 The financial exigencies of prepayment engender strong
2. Though all HMOs meeting the InterStudy definition, see note 1 supra, provide
very comprehensive care for the basic prepaid premium, HMOs do not provide literally
one hundred percent of medical needs without further charge. There are often coverage
limitations, though fewer than are common in conventional insurance policies; for
example, many HMOs do not provide free drugs. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDucAboN, AND WELFARE, BUREAU OF CoM mum'Y HEALTH SERVICES, INCLUSION OF
PHARMACEUICAL SERVICES IN HEALTH MAINTENANCE AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS: A
RnviENv OF SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS (DHEW Pub. No. (HSA)74-13017, 1974). More-
over, HlIOs' subscribers may have to make nominal additional payments for some
services. Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care
Crisis, 84 HARV. L. Rnv. 887, 902-03 & n.4 (1971).
3. There are many variations on the basic HlIO theme, with considerable diversity
in comprehensiveness of coverage, integration of services, and organization of affiliated
provider groups. See, e.g., Prussin, HMOs: Organizational and Financial Models (pts.
1-3), 55 Hosp. PRoR.ss 33 (Apr. 1974); id. at 56 (May 1974); id. at 60 (June 1974).
The character and strength of HMO economizing and risk-evaluating activities may vary
accordingly.
Organizationally, HMOs may be either prepaid group practices (PGPs), of which
the best known example is probably the Kaiser-Permanente plan, or foundations for
medical care (FMCs), of which the archetype is the San Joaquin, California, FMC. See,
e.g., Egdahl, Foundations for Medical Care, 288 NEw ENG. I. MED. 491 (1973);
Phelan, Erickson & Fleming, Group Practice Prepayment: An Approach to Delivering
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incentives for HMOs continually to weigh the medical effectiveness and
value of their expenditures and to curb, for example, superfluous
x-rays and other tests.4 Their resource constraint and duty to serve an
entire population also encourage HMOs both to maintain enrollees'
health, through education and preventive medicine wherever cost-effec-
tive, and to find and treat health problems before they become acute
and require sill more expensive measures, for which HMOs cannot be
reimbursed. The comprehensiveness and integration of their services
give EIMOs numerous occasions to evaluate alternatives in seeking to
achieve maximum health benefits for given expenditures 5-for ex-
Organized Health Services, 35 LAw & CONTEMp. PROB. 796 (1970).
The merits of PGPs versus FMCs in their various incarnations have been debated
elsewhere, and the respective virtues of the two forms of medical organization are not
relevant here. At issue here are the extent to which HMOs' efficiency incentives lead
them to create patterns of resource use and styles of care different from those of the fee-
for-service system and the implications of these differences for medical malpractice.
Either PGP or FMC organization may raise these issues; the remainder of this Article
does not generally distinguish between the two, except where the implications of the
differences are major.
4. The degree of risk to which the HMO is subjected for financial losses from over-
utilization of health care services may vary among HMOs. The way in which HMOs
translate their institutional economizing incentives into decision-making rules for the
doctors actually providing and ordering the services also varies. PGP doctors are usually
salaried; they have no incentive to provide extra services of only marginal risk-reducing
value, because their income is not increased by doing so. Roemer, On Paying the
Doctor and the Implications of Different Methods, 3 J. HEALTH & SocIAL BEHAviOR 4, 11
(Spring, 1962). Their positive incentive to economize comes from the identification of
their future prosperity with that of the PGP, the ability to use savings from reduction in
utilization for other services, and review of their care. FMC doctors are paid a fee for
each service rendered and thus retain the usual fee-for-service incentive to increase their
income by providing ever more services. However, FMC peer review must pass on the
value of many services provided and, if charges exceed revenues, some FMCs' doctors'
fees may be retroactively reduced. These factors motivate FMC physicians to weigh
costs. Egdahl, supra note 3, at 492, 495. FMC doctors' cost-controlling incentives are
probably weaker than those of PGP providers because they are imposed by outside
review rather than by the nature of the financing and because FMC doctors typically
retain a considerable outside practice, from which habits for serving insured fee-for-
service patients probably carry over into their FMC practice. These different FMC and
PGP arrangements may nevertheless have similar practical effects, and it is acceptable to
speak generally of HMO cost-counting incentives regardless of their exact strength or
their method of implementation.
5. Prepayment might instead motivate HMOs to maximize, for example, their own
profits or their personnel's salaries rather than enrollees' health. See note 9 infra.
Having to pay for all needed care, including that necessitated by their own neglect or
ineffective treatment, provides some protection against tendencies toward underservice.
Other protections include subscribers' ability to detect underservice, professional ethics,
some government regulations, and, of course, malpractice liability. The point is to
create malpractice incentives to deal with underservice without, in the process, inappro-
priately interfering with HMOs' desirable ability to count costs in evaluating what care
to provide.
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ample, by replacing physicians' services with nonphysician care when
appropriate, or by substituting outpatient for expensive inpatient care.0
HMOs' scope and integration also enable them to maintain unified
medical records, which can save time and resources as well as avoid
needless exposure to the hazards of inaccuracy and of duplicative or
incompatible diagnostic or therapeutic procedures. :HMOs' multipro-
vider organization also facilitates quality control through consultation,
referral, peer review, and other mechanisms, 7 while the lack of charges
for each service saves administrative costs, eases access to medical care,
and encourages subscribers to make full and early use of their HMO's
services.8
HMOs are not perfect, however. Their budget constraint and lack
of fee-for-service inducement to provide care can lead to overeconomiz-
ing and neglect of valuable opportunities to reduce patients' risks."
Moreover, HIMOs may feature some disadvantages of large-scale
organization, including reduced responsiveness to individual needs.10
Finally, HMOs do not appeal to all health care consumers; despite
much attention from health policy analysts, many HMOs have had diffi-
culty attracting enrollees and surviving in the medical services market-
place."
Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence that most prepayment
plans in fact provide comprehensive care which is of low risk and high
6. This factor is stronger among the more tightly integrated HMOs. FMCs do not
typically build their own outpatient clinics, for example, but depend instead on existing
facilities. FMC providers may thus not be able to perform certain procedures outside
rather than inside hospitals. Similarly, small PGPs may rely more heavily on inpatient
services than those which are larger and more comprehensive. HMOs may still be said
generally to offer wide opportunity for different allocations of medical resources, though
the exact situation varies from HMO to HMO.
7. See, e.g., P. ELLwooD, P. O'DoNoouE, W. McCLuRE, R. HOLLEY, et al.,
AssuiNo Tm QuALrry oF HEALTH CARE 21-22 (1973); Greenlick, The Impact of
Prepaid Group Practice on American Medical Care: A Critical Evaluation, 399 ANN lS
100 (1972); Institute of Medicine, Nat'1 Academy of Science, HMOs: Toward a Fair
Market Test 52 (policy statement, May, 1974).
8. The impact of these factors may be reduced by increased waiting time for
medical attention in some HMOs. H. ScHwARTz, THE CASE FOR AMERICAN MEDICINE
180-81 (1972).
9. The extreme example would be allowing a patient to die rather than to
undertake an expensive and perhaps uncertain treatment. See, e.g., H. SCHWART, supra
note 8, at 177. The worst HMO abuses are likely to occur in plans serving the least-
informed consumers, especially under conditions of government financing. See, e.g.,
Schneider & Stem, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Poor: Problems and
Prospects, 70 Nw. U.L REv. 90 (1975). See note 5 supra.
10. E.g., Phelan, Erickson, & Fleming, supra note 3, at 797-98.
11. It is not clear to what extent IMOs' difficulties in this regard are due to
dissatisfaction of potential enrollees. Legal and professional restraints against HMOs
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quality-and at a lower cost than fee-for-service care-by deviating
from many standard practices of fee-for-service providers.' " HMOs
have therefore been seen by many observers as an important and salu-
tary development in organizing health care services.'8  HMOs' promise
of improved access to and quality of care is important when many have
come to speak of a "right" to health care,14 and HMOs' economizing
abilities are important virtues at a time when health care consumes
about one twelfth of the country's gross national product. 5 In fact,
HMOs may help economize on two levels: first, HMOs are motivated to
strive for an efficient internal allocation of health-care resources, to
maximize the productivity of the resources they control; second, lMOs
may facilitate consumer valuation of health care as a whole in a way
that even insured fee-for-service care cannot. By offering a very com-
prehensive health care package, HMOs enable subscribers to budget
for medical care, to express their evaluation of the total worth to them
of all medical services-compared with their other expenditures. To
the extent that they are informed, subscribers' choice of an HMO may
also indicate what customary level of risk-reducing measures they de-
sire.1
Some -IMO proponents emphasize HMOs' potential to improve
access and to provide high-quality care at reasonable costs,' 7 whereas
and their physicians are also responsible. Compare Institute of Medicine, supra note 7,
at 19-49, with H. ScwAwrz, supra note 8, at 154-58.
12. NATIONAL ADvISoRY COMMISSION ON HEALTH MANPOWER, REPORT 197-229
(1967); Donabedian, An Evaluation of Prepaid Group Practice, 6 INQUIRY 3 (Sept.
1969); Roemer & Shonick, HMO Performance: The Recent Evidence, 51 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 271 (1973).
13. See, e.g., Health Maintenance Strategy, supra note 1; MacLeod & Prussin, The
Continuing Evolution of Health Maintenance Organizations, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED. 439
(1973); Saward & Greenlick, Health Policy and the HMO, 50 MILBANK MEMn. FUND Q.
147 (1972); Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care
Crisis, 84 HAIv. L. REV. 887 (1971). See also sources cited in notes 17-18 infra. HMOs
have also achieved federal recognition as a desirable innovation. See Health Mainte-
nance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e et seq. (Supp. III, 1973); The
President's Message to the Congress Proposing a Comprehensive Health Policy for the
Seventies, February 18, 1971, 7 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PREsiDENTiAL DOCUMENTS
244 (1971).
14. For example, Leonard Woodcock, President of the International Union, United
Automobile Workers, has maintained that "every American has a right to quality health
care services. . . ." Hearings on National Health Insurance Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 145 (1974).
15. Worthington, National Health Expenditures, 1929-74, 38 SOcIAL SECURITy BULL.
3, 6, Chart 1 (Feb. 1975).
16. See note 119 infra. While a person's joining an HMO does indicate that the
level of care it offers is satisfactory at that time, insofar as the subscriber can judge it,
membership does not preclude a subscriber's purchasing outside medical services should
the actual onset of illness or other circumstances change the subscriber's evaluation of
IMO coverage or services.
17. These are typified by the supporters of the IMO Act of 1973, which mandates
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others attach more importance to lIMOs' cost savings-achieved at little
or no sacrifice in quality-w-hich may lead other providers to balance
cost and quality more effectively, thus reducing total health care ex-
penditures.' 8 In any case, HMOs' ability and incentives to evaluate
and choose appropriately among different medical procedures are es-
sential to their social value, and undue interference with these HMO
attributes by malpractice law or otherwise"9 would be unfortunate.
B. HMOs' Approach to Medical Risk Evaluation
If IMOs were unfettered by outside requirements, they could be
expected to expend resources on risk reduction only until their ex-
penditures could be used to achieve greater benefits in alternative uses,
such as reducing other risks, expanding coverage, lengthening clinic
hours, lowering premiums, and extending medical services in other
ways.20 Neither IMOs nor other providers, of course, have special
expertise in valuing the increments of illness and health, injury and
cure, pain and relief, disability and recovery, or death and life that are
at stake in the risks they assess. Such valuations can come only from
patients themselves or from courts or other governmental authorities
acting on patients' behalf. Nonetheless, because they provide an
entire population with comprehensive care, HMOs are uniquely quali-
fied to choose the proper mb of medical inputs and processes2' for each
very comprehensive services for federally recognized HMOs. See, e.g., W. Roy, TmE
PROPOSED HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION AcT OF 1972 (1972); American Public
Health Ass'n, Health Maintenance Organizations: A Policy Paper, 61 AM. J. Put.
HEALTH 2528 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for
Health Services, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 716 (1970); McNeil & Schlenker, HMOs,
Competition, and Government, 53 MELBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 195 (1975); Institute of
Medicine, supra note 7.
19. One article, Havighurst & Bovbjerg, Professional Standards Review Organiza-
tions and Health Maintenance Organizations-Are They Compatible?, 1975 UTAH L.
REV. 381, considers the likely impact on HMOs of a nonmalpractice set of standards-
those of the federally mandated PSROs under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
20. This behavior would characterize a rational HMO dedicated to maintaining the
health of enrollees. But see notes 5 & 9 supra.
21. "Inputs" refers to the providers and facilities used in health care. "Processes"
are the methods or specific procedures used by health care providers. An important
reason why HMOs are uniquely qualified to determine the value of inputs and processes
is that, as providers of comprehensive care to entire populations, they have the ability to
gather the requisite data to determine medical effectiveness of different care, as individ-
ual providers do not. See, e.g., Brook, Critical Issues in the Assessment of Quality of
Care and Their Relationship to HMOs, 48 J. MED. EDUc. 114, 132-33 (Apr. 1973).
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type of case; that is, HMOs can equalize, within the limits of the state
of the art, the marginal risks that subscribers face from all hazards and
maximize the health benefits to subscribers for the amount of money
they are willing to devote to health care services.22
It may be argued that the level of care embodied in malpractice
standards is not susceptible to such analytic trading off of risks because
the incidence and severity of bad outcomes associated with any given
risk-reducing measure are unpredictable at best and unavoidable at
worst. Malpractice law indeed often purports to deal with slippery and
seemingly nonquantifiable matters of risk reduction, such as whether
a provider's skill is sufficient for a particular procedure or whether an
apparent slip of a scalpel in a particular case was culpable carelessness
or an unavoidable side effect of a difficult procedure. Nonetheless,
much of malpractice law involves quite discrete and manageable con-
cerns, such as whether particular diagnostic procedures should be
undertaken or whether particular safety precautions are appropriate.
Such matters clearly may be analyzed for medical and cost effective-
ness, which HMOs are well equipped to undertake.
In reality, moreover, even risks seeming to involve simple personal
carelessness are often not entirely of a different and unmanageable
type, but can instead profitably be treated as the far end of the same
continuum. Numerous measures might be taken to reduce the risk of
virtually any untoward result, if only marginally, and these are subject
to rational scrutiny as to their risk-reducing effectiveness, their cost, and
their other consequences. Except in emergency cases, for example,
consultation or supervision could be required, stricter diagnostic or
therapeutic protocols might be established, and so forth. In any case,
an HMO could hire additional personnel, or fee-for-service providers
could accept fewer patients, so as to allow more time to be devoted
22. This is not meant to imply that HMOs always make optimal decisions, judging
only cost and value to patients; factors other than the incentives engendered by a fixed
budget and the necessity to please enrollees are also involved. For example, the common
training and continued association of IMO and fee-for-service physicians are likely to
influence the HMO approach to medical decision-making in the direction of majority
practice. An HMO management's close ties with labor unions or dependence on them
for enrollees may lead to exclusive use of union-made products or services, almost
regardless of cost and quality concerns. Legal restrictions may play a part, as where
licensing laws prevent doctors from delegating certain tasks to trained and efficient
assistants who are not state-certified. Malpractice fears may also deter an HMO from
instituting cost-justified innovations. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, limited
knowledge (or the expense of learning more) may impede the optimizing of risk
reduction. The important point is that IMOs, unlike almost any other providers, are
well motivated and constituted to seek efficiency. It is not argued that they always
succeed.
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to individual cases, thus reducing the probability of inadvertent error.
Similarly, more highly trained (or more experienced or more careful)
personnel would presumably lower risks. All such measures-obvi-
ously accompanied by some monetary or other cost-would somewhat
lessen the incidence of bad results and negligence. Admittedly,
because of lack of knowledge, human imperfection, patient idiosyncra-
sies, or pure chance, some risk is irreducible regardless of the effort and
resources expended. Such truly unavoidable risk, however, may be
more appropriately considered within the domain of the doctrine of
informed consent 23 than as a matter of the proper level of risk avoid-
ance under the malpractice standard of care considered here, since by
hypothesis no amount of care can reduce the risk. In any event,
despite the irreducibility of some risks, there remains wide scope for
HMOs, freed of pressure to conform to fee-for-service practices, to
consider the value of particular risk-reducing actions.
C. Malpractice Standards and HMOs
Malpractice law has traditionally judged the behavior of medical
care providers almost exclusively by the customary practice of their
peers, 24 rather than by the usual standard of socially appropriate care-
the behavior of a hypothetical "reasonable and prudent!' man under the
same or similar circumstances. Thus, only in rare cases (predomi-
nantly those where risk evaluations can arguably be made by laymen)
do courts independently evaluate medical conduct.2
The paradigm of the standard of care required of any medical care
provider is that required of physicians, classically formulated as a duty to
23. Where economic or practical reasons make serious risks of medical intervention
irreducible, doctors must so apprise their patients and obtain their consent to proceed
before undertaking the intervention. See Note, Informed Consent in Medical Malprac-
tice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396 (1967); Note, Informed Consent as a Theory of Medical
Liability, 1970 Wis. L. Rtv. 879. Where medical intervention cannot completely
eliminate the bad result expected from the underlying condition, providers are also
protected from liability by the rule that due care does not guarantee a cure. See, e.g.,
Carl v. Matzko, 213 Pa. Super. 446, 249 A.2d 808 (1968).
24. See, e.g., HoLDER 40-43, 53-55; 1 LOuiSELL & WILLIAMS If 8.04; McCoid 558-60;
Note, An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 VmNID. L. REV. 729
(1970).
25. Such cases include leaving a sponge inside a patient after an operation, surgically
removing the wrong organ or part of the body, very incompetently setting a fracture,
burning a patient with hot water bottles, and failing to sterilize instruments. See
generally PROSSER 227-28; McCoid 621-31. In such cases, expert testimony showing
deviation from customary practice is not required. Note, Medical Specialist May Be
Found Negligent as a Matter of Law Despite Compliance with the Customary Practice
of the Specialty, 28 V~AN. L. REv. 441 (1975).
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possess the learning and skill and to use the care and diligence of the
ordinary practitioner in similar circumstances and to apply their best
judgment on behalf of patients.26 The standard does vary for different
providers, regions, and circumstances. Practitioners have traditionally
been held only to that level of care customary in their own or similar
localities. Where doctors differ as to what procedure is appropriate,
physicians may depart from the majority's customary practice to follow
that of a "reputable" or "respectable" minority of practitioners.2 8
Further, those holding themselves out as specialists are held to the cus-
tomary level of skill and care of their fellow specialists, presumed to
be a higher standard than that of a general practitioner.29
Malpractice law's enforcement of customary practice standards of
care has gone beyond simple requirements that doctors perform their
chosen treatments carefully, so as to avoid iatrogenic injury,30 and now
appears to govern the most basic decisions in medicine. Thus, a pro-
vider may be liable for failing to follow customary practice in making
a diagnosis or in choosing a treatment,31 although proof of causal con-
26. See, e.g., Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 210, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898); 1
LouisELL & WiLLiAMS 8.04; McCoid 558-60. Successful suits are almost always
founded on breach of the duty of care; it is extremely difficult to show lack of skill or
knowledge or failure to use best judgment. 1 LOuiSELL & WILLUAMS 11.05 & nn.
19-20.
27. E.g., 1 LOuiSELL & WmIL.AMs 8.06; Comment, Standard of Care for Medical
Practitioners-Abandonment of the Locality Rule, 60 KY. L.J. 209 (1971); Comment, A
Review of the Locality Rule, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 96. Specialists are frequently held to a
national rather than a local standard. See, e.g., Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 180
N.W.2d 788 (1970); Note, Torts-Medical Malpractice-Michigan Abandons "Locality
Rule" with Regard to Specialists, 40 FoRDHAM I R v. 435 (1971).
28. Bruce v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Cal. 1958); HoLDER 44-45; 1
LOuISELL & WILLiAMS, 8.04; ftossun, 163; McCoid 565.
29. HOLDER 55-57; 1 LOUIsELL & WiLmAMS 8.04; McCoid 566.
30. For example, when a patient with a broken arm comes to a doctor, the physician
is enjoined to set the fracture carefully, and to avoid making the cast too tight. See 2
LOUISELL & WiLLIAMs 614. Such safety standards govern the risks of medical interven-
tion itself, and-while important in themselves-do not directly affect the central
medical decisions on what care would best reduce the hazards of the underlying illness or
condition. HMOs and other innovative providers are probably least affected by this
aspect of malpractice law. (Standards of carefulness may have an indirect impact on
basic medical decisions; if a particular procedure must be carried out with extreme care,
the resulting increase in difficulty or cost may well cause the choice of an alternative
method.)
31. The doctor confronted with a probable fracture, to continue the prosaic example
of note 30 supra, is expected to conform to the standard practice of taking diagnostic x-
rays before setting the arm. See 1 LOUISELL & WmLIAmS 2.10 n.40; 2 LOUISELL &
WILLiAMS 719. Moreover, malpractice standards may dictate the form of treatment
itself. For instance, a broken arm should be set in a cast rather than given some other
therapy. E.g., Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937) (chiropractor
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nection with subsequent injury is more difficult where the complaint
involves failure to alter satisfactorily the natural course of a disease or
condition rather than introduction of new harm. 2 Such malpractice
regulation of providers' decision-making is a powerful and threatening
influence, going as it does to very fundamental matters of medical judg-
ment. Though cases alleging negligent diagnostic and treatment
decisions have in the past been relatively infrequent,33 their importance
seems to be growing, 4 with the result that the standard of care is more
and more seen as addressing not only the carefulness to be exercised
but also the medical care to be rendered. Providers' perception that
omission of available procedures can be an important determinant of
liability may well prompt providers to adopt elaborate diagnostic and
therapeutic regimes without clear consideration of their cost and
value. 5 This aspect of malpractice law may be the most troublesome
for innovative and cost-conscious providers.
The malpractice standard of care applied to HMO health care ser-
vices is the same as that governing medical services generally. In
practice, however, HMO exposure to liability may differ from that of
other providers. For one thing, an HMO itself, as well as its constitu-
ent hospitals, physicians, nurses, and other personnel, may be liable for
malpractice, under either contract36 or negligence37 theories of respon-
found negligent for treating fractured hip with manipulation); Tell v. Taylor, 191 Cal.
App. 2d 266, 12 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1961) (osteopathic manipulation of fractured hip
negligent).
32. See notes 84-86 infra and accompanying text.
33. Diagnostic errors (and the consequent failure to treat a condition) have not
traditionally been an important basis for malpractice claims. Among malpractice
insurance claims settled in 1970, only one in seven allegedly negligent incidents involved
diagnostic failures. Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims
Files Closed in 1970, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 1, 9.
34. See, e.g., Curran & Moseley, The Malpractice Experience of Health Maintenance
Organizations, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 69, 85 n.72 (1975); Note, Negligence-Medical
Malpractice-Should Lack of Diligence in Diagnosis Resulting in Loss of Chance to Live
Be a Compensable Injury?, 3 SETON HALL L. REv. 505 (1972).
35. The lack of consideration given to cost and value in setting customary practice is
a major theme of this Article. See notes 46-76 infra and accompanying text. Diagnos-
tic "accuracy" is used here to mean overall correctness of diagnosis. Such lay terminol-
ogy glosses over the technical difference between a test's sensitivity and its specificity;
more properly, one might hypothesize that a test increases true positive or true negative
diagnoses and decreases false positives or false negatives. See McNeil, Keeler & Adel-
stein, Primer on Certain Elements of Medical Decision Making, 293 NEw ENG. J. MED.
211 (1975).
36. See generally Curran & Moseley, supra note 34, at 70-77. HMOs' contractual
liability for enrollee injuries is somewhat problematic. HiMO contracts are thorough-
going, typically promising to provide all needed medical services within certain rather
comprehensive limits. See generally sources cited in note 3 supra. A sample subscriber-
1-1Me contract is printed in J. KaEss & I. SINGER, HMO HANDBOOK 54-62 (1975). A
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sibility, thus allowing plaintiffs an additional potential defendant,
though not altering the standard of care applied. s Other differences
disgruntled subscriber-patient might sue in contract if an HMO simply failed to offer
particular services or facilities it had promised to provide. A more radical complaint
might be that the HMO contract entitled a subscriber to particular procedures that were
inappropriately withheld. This is essentially a claim of negligent failure to treat, which
courts might or might not choose to hear in contract. In any such inquiry, the exact
wording of the HMO contract and the definition of medical "need" would be crucial; this
inquiry would greatly resemble one for negligence, and what services are "needed" under
an HMO's contract would probably have to be determined by reference to medical
custom generally. Ironically, while this Article contends that customary practice may
often be a poor malpractice standard for IMOs, some customary standards would be
essential to limit HMOs' contractual obligations.
Alternatively, a warranty of due care might be legally implied from an HMO's
undertaking to treat patients, as one often was in early malpractice cases. See, e.g.,
Adkins v. Ropp, 105 Ind. App. 331, 334, 14 N.E.2d 727, 728 (1938), quoting Adolay v.
Miller, 60 Ind. App. 656, 659-60, 111 N.E. 313, 314 (1916) ("a physician. . . is held in
law to have impliedly contracted [to] exercise at least reasonable skill, diligence and
care"). See generally HOLDER 1-7. However, few jurisdictions today still allow mal-
practice complaints to be framed in contract, rather than in tort; most hold that
malpractice actually sounds in tort. E.g., Gauteri v. New Rochelle Hosp., 4 App. Div.
2d 874, 166 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 952, 157 N.E.2d 172, 183 N.Y.S.2d
803 (1959). See generally 1 LOUSSELL & WILLIAms 8.03; McCoid 550-53; Miller, The
Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 413; Note,
Contractual Liability in Medical Malpractice, 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 212 (1974).
37. Like all employers, HMOs are responsible for the negligence of their employees
or agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Bernardi v. Community Hosp.
Ass'n, 166 Colo. 280, 443 P.2d 708 (1968); PROSSER § 70; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY § 219 (1957); Southwick, The Hospital's New Responsiblity, 17 CLEv.-MAR. L.
REv. 146 (1968).
HMOs may also be responsible for the provision of care by non-employees under
what seems to be an emerging doctrine of institutional negligence: where patients
justifiably look to a health care institution to select, supervise, or vouch for the actual
provider of care, the institution must take appropriate steps to protect patients from
unwarranted risks. This principle seems to be the common thread of several develop-
ments in hospital liability. Thus, hospitals may be held liable for the negligence of non-
employee doctors under a theory of apparent agency, especially where a doctor's
principal practice is in the hospital. See Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App.
165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972) (radiologist); Principles of Hospital Liability, 2a Hosp. L.
MA~uAL 2-1 nn.46 & 51 (1972). Hospitals may also be liable for insufficiently
weighing the potential risk of harm to patients from non-employee doctors with hospital
"staff privileges." See Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972);
Mitchell County Hosp. Authority v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972);
Principles of Hospital Liability, supra, 1-4 n.35 (1972). Another source of hospital
liability may be emerging-a duty to supervise ongoing institutional care and, where
appropriate, to require consultation in the interest of preventing unduly risky care. See
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-
Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship With the Staff Physician, 9 CALIF.
W.L. REv. 429, 443-53 (1973).
Such precedents from hospital law could easily be applied to HMOs, since HMOs'
promises to provide their enrollees with health care services are much more direct than
are those of hospitals. Moreover, HMOs' control over services may also be greater,
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in HMO and fee-for-service malpractice experience, such as patients'
increased willingness to sue engendered by impersonal HMO care, are
sometimes cited,39 but these are largely behavioral rather than legal and
are unrelated to this Article's main concern, the impact on HMOs of
the customary practice standard itself. This impact is strong not only
because of the fundamental influence of the standards themselves but
also because of the generally increasing frequency and cost of malprac-
tice claims and all medical care providers' concern about them.4"
Malpractice standards are thus coming to constitute an ever more
considerable incentive toward customary practice.41
since HMOs periodically negotiate, on behalf of their subscribers, specific terms of
service with their associated doctor groups which actually provide the services. See, e.g.,
Curran & Moseley, supra note 34, at 74-75. A sample medical service agreement and
hospital contract are presented in J. I.RnSS & J. SINGER, supra note 36, at 63-80.
38. HMO liability founded on Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp.,
33 IL. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966), might
conceivably result in a somewhat different standard of care than would HMO liability
grounded in respondeat superior. Whereas the latter vicarious liability would typically
result from HMO providers' deviance from standard practice, Darling found negligence
in part in the defendant institution's deviance from its own internal rules and
regulations-not necessarily the same as those of other providers. Id. at 331, 211
N.E.2d at 257.
39. E.g., Curran & Moseley, supra note 34, at 81. See also The Malpractice Crisis:
How It Affects HMOs (pt. 2), HEALTH SERVICES NIFORMATION, Sept. 22, 1975, at 5.
40. Until the 1960s, the probability of a provider's being sued for malpractice in
connection with any single service was extremely low. A 1957 American Medical
Association survey found that only one doctor in seven (i.e. about fourteen percent) was
a malpractice defendant at any time during his entire career. Opinion Survey on
Medical Professional Liability, 164 J.A.M.A. 1583 (1957). An extreme, non-representa-
tive contrast is the 1972 experience in northern California, where twenty-one claims
were filed for every 100 physicians. CAL. ASSEMBLY SELECT COMM. ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE, PRELIMINARY REPORT 15 (June 1974).
The much-discussed current malpractice "crisis," however, is less a problem of
physicians actually being sued than it is one of liability insurance-its decreasing
availability and increasing cost. See, e.g., Malpractice in Focus (Aug. 1975) (an AMA
Source Document prepared by the editors of Prism). How much legal standards have
contributed to these problems (as opposed to patients' litigiousness, larger jury awards,
and other factors) is quite uncertain, but it is clear that great publicity has made doctors
more aware than ever of the importance of malpractice standards and legal doctrines for
their practice. See, e.g., Welch, Medical Malpractice, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1372
(1975).
41. Six years ago, a leading authority commented, "Mhe most effective mechanism
for coercing compliance with customary standards of care is the threat of malpractice
litigation . .. ." Bernzweig, HEW Response to the Subcommittee, in SunCOMM. ON
ExEcTn REORGANizATON, SENATE COMM. ON GOvERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, 91ST
CONG., 1sT SEss., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN 18
(Comm. Print 1969). Since then, the latest "crisis" has further exacerbated malpractice
fears-probably even beyond the actual increased impact of malpractice suits and awards.
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PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT MALPRACTICE
APPROACH TO HMO CARE
HMO practice, like all medical care, should be subject to judicial
scrutiny. But the best means of implementing such legal oversight are
debatable. The current use of customary medical practice as the mal-
practice standard of care poses a number of troubling problems, par-
ticularly for innovative providers like HMOs. The following discussion
of four such problems is predicated on the realistic postulate that much
is uncertain about the provision and value of health care services, so
that there is a considerable legitimate leeway for HMOs to diverge from
majority custom, on either medical or economic grounds.
Medical practitioners generally-regardless of the form of their
payment-often disagree about the medical effectiveness of particular
procedures. 42 Such divergent medical views may involve not only the
obvious difficulty of choosing between types of medical intervention (is
one drug, operation, or treatment as good as another-in result and
risk?), but also less obvious cases of selecting the proper provider (are
paramedicals as competent as doctors in certain fields?) or style of care
(is outpatient treatment preferable to inpatient care in some in-
stances?). A cost-conscious LIMO, for example, might choose to treat
heart attack victims in their homes rather than in hospital coronary care
units. There is substantial medical research evidence, largely from
Britain, that at-home treatment achieves the same results as hospital
care,43 but American custom is decidedly contrary, and thus outpatient
42. See generally A. CoCHRANs, EFFECTiENESS AND EFFICMNCY: RANDOM REFLEC-
TONS ON HEALTH SERVICES (1972). Because of their immediate resource constraints,
however, HMOs might be expected to question more readily a procedure's medical
effectiveness than might fee-for-service practitioners. But see note 89 infra.
43. Mather, Pearson, Read, et al., Acute Myocardial Infarction: Home and Hospital
Treatment, 3 Brrr. MED. J. 334, 336-37 (1971). See also A. COcHRANE, supra note 42,
at 50-54; Hofvendahl, Influence of Treatment in a Coronary Care Unit on Prognosis in
Acute Myocardial Infarction, AcrA MED. ScANDINAviA 519 (Supp. 1971); Hutter, Sidel,
Shine, et al., Early Hospital Discharge After Myocardial Infarction, 288 NEw ENG. J.
MD. 1141, 1143-44 (1973) (heart patients receive no additional benefit from three
weeks' hospitalization over two weeks' stay).
There is growing recognition that in much of modem medicine, as in coronary care,
the benefits of customary practices are either not well established or not worth their
costs in resources and new risks. For excellent short summaries of this line of thought,
see A. CocHRANE, supra; Neuhauser, The Future of Proprietaries in American Health
Services, in REGULATING HEALTH FAcmrrEs CONSTRUCTION 233, 233-37 (C. Havighurst
ed., 1974); and U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, FORWARD PLAN FOR HEALTH, FY 1977-81, at 144-61 (DHEW Pub. No.
(OS)76-50024, 1975).
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treatment might create considerable malpractice problems where pa-
tients suffer reverses or die.44
An HMO's practice might also diverge from fee-for-service custom
because of a different valuation of the benefits undeniably achieved by
customary action or nonactions. Thus, there might be universal agree-
ment that a certain test improves the accuracy of a diagnosis from
ninety to ninety-five percent in some moderately serious and generally
treatable condition; a fee-for-service doctor would almost certainly per-
form such a test if it were readily available and covered by insurance,
since no obvious benefit for his patient or himself could be achieved
by foregoing the potential insurance payment. 45  On the other hand,
an HMO might decide that its subscribers' resources were better spent,
for example, on upgrading the staff of its emergency room than on the
test. Such valuation problems are at the heart of tort law's establishing
appropriate levels of risk and, in various forms, cause the most intract-
able difficulties in the application to HMOs of standards derived from
customary insured fee-for-service practice.
A. Inadequate Valuation of the Costs and Results of Reducing Risks
Whereas the law of negligence generally evaluates risky behavior
through an independent judicial assessment of its reasonableness, medi-
cal malpractice cases judge health care providers almost exclusively by
their compliance with customary medical practice.46 Whether this sub-
stitution of medical custom for judicial evaluation is desirable depends
upon how well customary practice standards achieve the goals of negli-
gence law.
A major goal of tort standards is to achieve the socially optimal
level of risk in the various activities society undertakes, including pro-
viding medical care.47 Negligence rules accomplish this by holding
non-optimal behavior substandard and by requiring compensation of
44. For example, Armstrong v. Svoboda, 240 Cal. App. 2d 502, 49 Cal. Rptr. 701
(1966), held that a doctor was negligent in not immediately hospitalizing a patient
whose electrocardiogram indicated possibly serious cardiac abnormalities. Hospitaliza-
tion for known heart attack would seem to be a fortiori required.
45. See Brook, Brutoco, & Williams, The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice
and Quality of Care, 1975 DuKE L.. 1197.
46. See notes 24-29 supra and accompanying text.
47. Deterrence and compensation are often cited as twin goals of tort law. E.g., W.
SEAVEY, P. KEETON, & L KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1
(1964). Deciding what behavior should be deterred and which injuries should be
compensated, however, requires deciding upon the optimal level of risk for each activity.
See Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 DuKn
LI. 1179, 1190-91. See also sources cited in note 49 infra.
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victims injured by failure to take appropriate safety measures. 48  The
relevant considerations here are the degree of risk of the activity, the
risk-reducing capacity of various precautionary steps, and the costs and
benefits of running and reducing the risks; the law should encourage
taking all risk-reducing steps the cost of which is smaller than the cost
of running the unreduced risk.49
The customary practice of parties engaged in a given enterprise
is quite relevant to judicial evaluation of whether particular safety
measures are appropriate, and evidence of customary practice is gener-
ally admissible for the factfinder to weigh in deciding whether the
standard of due care was met.50 The probative value of such evidence
is somewhat limited, though many virtues are sometimes ascribed to
48. This simplified formulation ignores negligence law's concern that a duty to act
be established before the cost of risk-running versus risk-reduction calculus is applied. In
the case of medical malpractice, the duty to avoid negligence to a patient is clear, and
deciding when the provider-patient relationship is established is seldom difficult.
49. Requiring measures to reduce risk where the marginal cost of each reduction of
risk is less than its value (the cost of running the risks and allowing injuries to occur)
will achieve the optimum amount of risk reduction, that is, the minimum injury and
injury prevention costs. R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 69-70 (1973); Brown,
Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUDms 323 (1973); Calabresi &
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability, 81 YAL L.J. 1055, 1057 (1972).
Judge Learned Hand's famous formulation of the negligence standard of care sets
forth just such a test:
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant
of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with
the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest
which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk. Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611,
612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941).
See Brown, supra; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STrDmEs 29 (1972); Note,
Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurences, 84 YALE L.. 1141
(1975).
Theoretically, other legal rules which incorporated the correct social valuations of
costs, risks, and results could achieve the same optimal result. A strict liability test, for
example, could induce exactly the same level of risk-reducing precautions; a major
difference would be that the cost of injuries not worth avoiding would fall on medical
care providers rather than on injured patients as under the fault system. See Calabresi,
Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YAL L.J. 656, 666-70 (1975). (This might also
mean that different amounts of medical care would be undertaken.) At the theoretical
extreme, under idealized circumstances of perfect information and no transaction costs,
market economic theory holds that any (or no) liability rule would achieve optimal risk
reduction, since the parties involved would bargain with each other (by hypothesis, at no
cost) until optimality was attained. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw &
EcON. 1 (1960); Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability
Rules-A Comment, 11 J. LAW & EON. 67 (1968). See also notes 55-57 infra and
accompanying text. Malpractice rules, however, are negligence rules, and only the
negligence approach is considered here.
50. PROSSER 162, 227; Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147,
1153-54 (1942).
1391
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1975:1375
it.51 At a minimum, however, evidence of custom shows the practical
and economic feasibility of undertaking certain safety precautions (and
customary ommission, in contrast, may hint the inappropriateness of
undertaking them) and establishes that a defendant had the opportun-
ity to learn what untaken precautions were feasible.5 2  Evidence of
medical custom, of course, plays a much larger role.
There seem to be two principal justifications for judicial reliance
on medical custom to set malpractice standards. The first is intensely
practical: most medical decision-making is beyond the ken of lay-
men-patients, judges, and juries alike-so that decisions and evalua-
tions of them are thought better left to experts, with the judicial role
largely limited to weighing credibility." This rationale is apparent in
the major exception to the requirement for expert testimony of medical
negligence, namely, that laymen may testify to, and lay factfinders may
independently evaluate, alleged negligence involving circumstances
clearly comprehensible to non-experts, such as failure to x-ray a sus-
pected fracture. The rationale is partly persuasive: clearly, only medi-
cal experts can be expected to assess medical probabilities-the normal
and usual hazards of certain conditions, the likely success of particular
risk-reducing interventions, and so on.54 In this, medicine, like other
51. Among these rather nebulous virtues are the stability that custom brings to
society; the desirability of limited autonomy for certain groups, e.g., professionals;
custom's internal moral quality of rightness; and the harshness of requiring more than
customary safeguards. See Linde, Custom in Negligence Law, 11 CAN. B.I. 151, 152-
54 (1968).
52. Morris, supra note 50, at 1147-53.
53. This judicial deference to medical expertise parallels the typical patient's defer-
ence to his doctor's opinion. See notes 63-66 infra and accompanying text. Clarence
Morris clearly states this rationale: "[No other standard [than medical custom] is
practical. Our judges and juries are usually not competent to judge whether or not a
doctor has acted reasonably. The conformity test is probably the only workable test
available." Id. at 1164.
54. The pervasive impact of uncertainty in medical care may well be the decisive
factor here, as in many aspects of the health care enterprise. See Arrow, Uncertainty
and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. ECON. REV. 941 (1963). Despite
a physician's possession of acceptable skill and use of accepted procedures, one can never
be sure that the desired outcomes will be achieved. At its most basic level, this is the
familiar problem of causality. Doctors accept a diagnosis or therapeutic procedure as
effective based upon statistical evidence of its efficacy in a certain proportion of cases;
absolute certainty that a method will be followed by a certain result is elusive and rare.
Moreover, clear and undisputed proof of effectiveness by the accepted methods of
statistically standardized or randomized controlled trials is surprisingly uncommon. The
clinical judgment of each doctor thus has a very large role to play. Under these
circumstances, it is easy to understand the law's reluctance to set its own independent
standards, which would require judging whether particular procedures actually cause the
risk reduction (achieve the results) they are meant to. The question of causal connec-
tion of medical procedure and particular result, of course, arises not only in deciding on
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technical areas, is not susceptible to unaided judicial inquiry. How-
ever, doctors and other medical providers are not experts in valuing in
social terms the expected results or costs inherent in particular stand-
ards; in fact, they may quite inappropriately weigh the social costs of
taking a risk-reducing precaution, even where they very accurately
assess its medical effectiveness. Nonetheless, by accepting medical
custom as the legal standard of care, malpractice law has implicitly left
both the assessment of risk and the valuation of cost and results to the
judgment of medical practitioners. It should be recognized that the
standards thus established can only be as good as the circumstances and
incentives which give rise to medical custom.
The second rationale for customary practice standards in fact
recognizes this, but asserts that custom-representing the aggregate of
individual judgments as to what medical care is appropriate-can best
set the social norm. This reasoning starts with an ideal type of custo-
mary standards of care and safety-those established in the course of
perfectly free market transactions between parties who are fully
informed, equal in bargaining position, and capable of extensive and
inexpensive bargaining. Custom developed under such circumstances
should indeed indicate the socially optimum level of risk avoidance-
at least as between the bargaining parties, since they should know
better than any court how much they want to reduce their own risks.
Parties to hazardous activities can bargain with each other to reduce
risks as much as they feel worthwhile, and to have irreducible risk fall
on the party better able to bear bad results. Medical risks seem par-
ticularly well covered by this reasoning, since they are almost exclu-
sively limited to the individual patients involved,55 who theoretically
participate in valuing them and agree to undergo them. 6 Since third
the appropriate standard of care, but also in assessing whether failure to meet the
established standard actually caused a given injury. Here, though expert testimony is
again needed, it is not determinative; the final decision is the legal factfinder's. 1
LouISELL & WILLIAMS 11.20; B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE
147-52 (1959). See also notes 84-88 infra and accompanying text.
55. There are some exceptions to this-for example, a surgeon may operate on the
wrong person. Interestingly, in this case of harm to an outsider, malpractice liability
follows almost automatically upon proof of the facts, and the law does not look to
medical practice as a guide. E.g., O'Grady v. Wickman, 213 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1968). (Such cases may be treated as batteries rather than as negligence.) In the
main, however, a decision on one patient's standard of care directly affects only that
patient.
56. In theory, if fully informed patients knowingly chose the level of care they
actually received, no legal intervention would be necessary. See note 49 supra. In
reality, of course, patients largely put themselves in their doctors' hands; what they seek
from medical providers is their medical expertise, including knowledge of what risk-
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parties not privy to provider-patient agreements on care are not at risk,
their exclusion from standard-setting is immaterial. Provider-patient
agreements as to what risk reduction is appropriate may thus be taken
to establish the socially optimal standard of care for all.57  The medi-
cal custom rule has been cogently defended on this market-theory
ground.58
These theoretical underpinnings of medical custom standards are
unfortunately not very persuasive in practice, at least not to the extent
that the standards draw upon the customs of insured fee-for-service
practitioners, who dominate the medical care market.59 Most attacks
on the rule emphasize that it may perniciously allow an entire in-
dustry-or subset thereof-to legitimize its own corner-cutting as the
standard of due care, validating through its own practice what inde-
pendent assessment would label negligence.60 Neither the theory nor
the law of customary practice standards gives much attention to the
possibility that an entire industry may set standards too high, or perhaps
too high in some areas and too low in others. In the usual market case,
of course, a rational decision-maker will not behave uneconomically
with respect to safety precautions (and thus systematically lose money)
by undertaking procedures which add less value to a marketable
product or service than they cost"1 or by foregoing procedures which
would reduce risk more than they cost.6" The peculiar organization
and economics of contemporary insured fee-for-service medical care,
however, do not fit these classic optimizing economic assumptions. In
particular, fee-for-service practice is apt systematically to give insuffici-
ent weight to the cost of providing services, as opposed to the reduction
of risk they achieve. Since malpractice law adopts medical custom as
reducing steps are appropriate. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 54, at 964-66. See also
notes 63-66 infra and accompanying text.
57. Because individuals cannot appropriately judge their own standards of care, see
note 56 supra, malpractice law undertakes to protect them from aberrant physicians'
judgments through the custom rule.
58. R. POSNER, supra note 49, at 72.
59. About 6.5 million people are now enrolled in HMOs, according to InterStudy,
HEALTH SERVICES INFoRMATION, Aug. 11, 1975, at 1, so that some 200 million others are
served-if at all-by fee-for-service providers.
60. See, e.g., The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932); Favalora v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1962).
61. Morris, for example, succinctly dismisses this consideration: "Super-cautious
industrial usages are conceivable, but the self-interest of businessmen checks milquetoast-
ish fears." Morris, supra note 50, at 1161.
62. Of course, the relevant risks here are those to the parties in the transaction or to
others whom the liability rule internalizes into the transaction. Risks to outsiders will be
ignored, except as a matter of charity or public relations.
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its standard, its requirements of due care are also often apt to be too
high.
The theoretical assumption that customary medical practice
reflects provider-patient agreements on risk reduction is also highly sus-
pect. Providers and patients do not usually negotiate over the provi-
sion of health care services.6 3  Providers have a near-monopoly on
medical expertise; once patients make the initial decisions to seek care,
they generally delegate most decision-making to medical professionals.
Of necessity, patients rely on their doctors and others to evaluate the
medical risks they face, both from disease and from medical interven-
tion. Indeed, a doctor's principal products are his knowledge, skill, and
expertise. Physicians make almost all medical decisions, including
what standard of care is appropriate, and most patients-especially
very sick ones-simply accept the services their doctors decide are
needed. 64 This physician dominance underlies the common observa-
tion that doctors can "create demand" for their own and other medical
services."5 Given this delegation of decision-making, patients' "pur-
chase" of medical services is hardly an arm's-length transaction be-
tween well-informed equals agreeing on the provision of a certain
standard of care for a certain price according to their interests and eval-
uations. Rather, doctors are relatively free to consider many other
factors besides the benefit and cost to the patient and the probable
reduction of risk in deciding whether to provide or order a given serv-
ice. 60
Nonetheless, the dominance of physicians in decision-making
would not by itself necessarily result in standards of uneconomical risk
reduction; most doctors doubtless take quite seriously their fiduciary
63. In contrast, an HMO's subscribers, at least as a group, may well be able to
bargain over the general style of their medical care, including, for example, what'
facilities are to be provided and whether physician assistants are acceptable. But sick
IMO patients are no more apt to bargain over the actual provision of their care than are
fee-for-service patients-perhaps less so, since they do not pay extra for the services
received.
64. See, e.g., Lave & Lave, Medical Care and Its Delivery: An Economic Appraisal,
35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 252, 258-59 (1970).
65. This is supported by the finding that spending on physicians' services is best
predicted by technology and the number of physicians and not by patient demand
factors. V. Fucus & M. KYaMER, DETERMNANTS OF EXPENDnTuRES FOR PHYSICANS'
SERVICES IN THE U.S., 1948-1968, at 2 (1973).
66. Such factors could include the effect on provider income, professional or
institutional prestige, humanitarianism, desire to experiment, desire to maintain high
technical expertise, and even the desire to avoid any chance of a malpractice suit,
however nonmeritorious. None of these has any bearing on what standard of risk
reduction is appropriate, yet they clearly may influence medical custom.
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duty to patients and would not bankrupt them in an uncertain quest
for small reductions in risk. Doctors owe no fiduciary duty, however,
to the insurers and government agencies that pay for the lion's share
of medical care, including almost all hospital care, where most malprac-
tice claims arise. In the insured fee-for-service sector, sick patients
perceive nearly "free" care, providers see open-ended financing, and
third-party payors (largely governmental and private insurers) are
removed from the provision of services and have only weak capabilities
for injecting cost considerations into the balance. 8  Providers of
insured medical services can be expected to consider not whether their
patients or society can afford a particular risk-reducing measure, but
rather only whether their patients will receive any medical benefit.
Freed of cost concerns, physicians often feel an ethical obligation to
do everything possible for their patients.6 9 As a moral principle under
the circumstances this may be unimpeachable, but it is clearly a poor
decision rule for the social valuations of malpractice law. °70
67. Between eighty and ninety percent of Americans are estimated to have some
form of health insurance, with half of them carrying quite comprehensive coverage.
Mueller, Private Health Insurance in 1973: A Review of Coverage, Enrollment, and
Financial Experience, 38 SOCIAL SECURiTY BuLL. 21 (Feb. 1975). Private insurers and
governmental programs now pay about sixty-three percent of personal health care
expenditures, while individuals pay only about thirty-five percent themselves, Worthing-
ton, supra note 15, at 16, Table 6, but just how much malpractice occurs in the course of
uninsured and insured care is not clear. One would expect most malpractice to arise
from serious cases, the expense of which is likely to be covered by insurance. For
example, almost ninety percent of personal health care expenditures for hospital care is
now paid for by third parties, id. at 15, Chart 2, and about seventy-five percent of
malpractice claims filed concern hospital occurrences, Rudov, Myers, & Mirabella, supra
note 33, at 10.
68. This analysis of the workings of insured fee-for-service medical care is not
original. An extremely clear and complete presentation is given in Address by W.
McClure, The Medical Care System Under National Health Insurance: Four Models that
Might Work and Their Prospects 11-20, American Political Science Convention, Sept.,
1975.
69. Thus, a doctor notes, "as a physician, I have been taught throughout my
professional career that I had an absolute obligation to my patients to provide them with
the highest quality medical care within my reach, almost without regard to cost." Caper,
The Meaning of Quality in Medical Care, 291 Nnw ENG. J. MED. 1136 (1974). See
also V. FucHs, WHO SHALL Livn? 60 (1974) (physicians guided in part by "technologi-
cal imperative" to do everything they can, "regardless of the benefit-cost ratio").
70. This analysis is not meant to condemn insurance, which is a salutory means for
policyholders to reduce the uncertainties of their otherwise unpredictable financial
outlays for illness. Further, people doubtless also buy insurance because it enables them
to buy more risk reduction collectively than they could individually; not all insurance-
financed safety measures are worth less to policyholders than their cost. Nonetheless,
because of the structural separation of the roles of policyholder, insurer, doctor, and
patient, medical decisions on insured care are made with little regard for cost. Unlike
HMOs, third-party insurers have not developed effective claims-reviewing capabilities.
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That many insured fee-for-service providers do in fact often
provide too much care and take too many precautions71 is most
obviously illustrated by the prevalence of "unnecessary" surgical or
other procedures,72 including "defensive" medicine.7 3  The existence
of these phenomena-which are of no use to patients-is widely con-
ceded, though their extent is much debated. 74  (Some commentators
claim to detect a more subtle phenomenon: a pervasive tendency in
customary practice to seek to eliminate all risks to patients, regardless
of cost.75) Significantly, many such assessments that the fee-for-
service sector over-treats its patients are made by comparing usual prac-
tice with that of HMOs.76
The main deficiency of the medical custom rule is that it derives
the malpractice standard of care from medical practice dominated by
insured fee-for-service care, the providers of which can make decisions
with little regard for actual social cost. Applying such standards to
HMO practice pressures HMOs to conform to this non-optimizing
behavior and reduces the likelihood that HMOs will evolve different
styles of practice offering valuable insights to other providers and to
legal standard-setters alike.
Testimony of C. Havighurst, Hearings on Competition in the Health Services Market
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1076-77 (1974).
71. However, just as availability of insurance may cause over-reduction of risks in
some areas, lack of insurance coverage may somewhat inhibit taking justifiable precau-
tions in others.
72. See, e.g., Blackstone, Misallocation of Medical Resources: The Problem of
Excessive Surgery, 22 PuB. POLICY 329 (1974); McCarthy & Widmer, Effects of
Screening by Consultants on Recommended Elective Surgical Procedures, 291 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1331 (1974).
73. "Defensive medicine" is the pejorative term used to describe complete dominance
of legal over medical considerations, either undertaking a medical procedure to protect a
provider against lawsuit rather than to benefit a patient or not undertaking a procedure
out of fear of suit.
74. For example, compare Welch, supra note 40, at 1375 (defensive medicine costs
at least $3 billion annually), with Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of
Defensive Medicine, 1971 DuK L.J. 939, 957 (phenomenon exists, but is overrated).
75. Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care:
The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 6 (1975). The authors call the phenomenon
"the quality imperative." Id. at 20-30.
76. Blackstone, supra note 72, at 343-44. Some other studies of unnecessary
procedures compare rates in the United States with those of Great Britain, where the
health of the population is comparable to that of the United States and where the
National Health Service, which provides comprehensive care from limited resources,
closely resembles a nationwide HMO. Bunker, Surgical Manpower: A Comparison of
Operations and Surgeons in the United States and England and Wales, 282 Nnw EN. J.
MED. 135 (1970).
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B. Overemphasis on Methods of Care
Not only is the theoretical and practical desirability of deriving
malpractice standards from practice in the contemporary medical ser-
vices market quite uncertain, but also there is a danger that the nature
of the customary standards themselves may tend to inhibit medical
practice from best evaluating medical risks. Medical custom standards,
like other negligence standards, necessarily address the manner in
which people ought to act and the precautions they ought to take, not
7he level of risk or pattern of results they ought to achieve.77 But, lack-
ing an independent assessment of reasonableness, this concentration on
methods of care-potentially including nearly everything health care
providers do-makes malpractice standards a very thoroughgoing
regulation 8 and may well inappropriately increase costs and inhibit
77. Since the relation between a particular medical procedure and the final result is
seldom totally clear, the perfect system for judging optimal risk reduction would look
almost exclusively at the pattern of outcomes achieved, the actual effects on patients'
health. Improved results, after all, are the goal of the presumably risk-reducing inputs
and processes used, and the use of statistical results would obviate the need for case-by-
case analysis of causation. See generally AssuRiNG Tr QuALrrY OF HEALTH CARE,
supra note 7, at 25-49. James W. Bush, M.D., has suggested using a "coefficient of
causality" he has developed to supersede the traditional notion of proximate cause.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A DIsCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION AND QUALITY
CONTROL SYSTEMS 22-24 (D. McDonald ed., Center for the Study of Dem. Inst., 1971).
Although malpractice law commendably intervenes only after a demonstrably bad result,
in practice the law must concern itself with methods used rather than with results
achieved. Particularized standards of conduct help achieve compliance with legal
requirements of the optimum level of risk reduction; it would be difficult for providers
to obey an injunction to achieve a certain level of risk and no more. One book, 1
LoVIsELL & WLLAms f 8.04-.05, for example, praises the legal adoption of particular-
ized standards of practice as "objective," unlike the "subjective" reasonable man test.
Moreover, since every malpractice case involves only one outcome, a bad one, some
standards must be adopted to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable bad outcomes.
The formulation of legal standards guiding the use of inputs and processes serves this
function. The essential determination to be made is whether the adopted standards
actually achieve the desired outcome. This determination is left to medical custom.
78. Malpractice considerations may constrain medical decision making at almost
every point. See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text. The application of
negligence principles to nonmedical activity usually involves less thoroughgoing specifi-
cation of behavior. Car manufacturers, for example, may be enjoined to produce safe
vehicles, but need not mimic their competitors' construction of bumpers or brakes.
Moreover, product liability does not typically spell out all the attributes a car should
have, whereas almost every aspect of a medical providers business-his knowledge, skill,
judgment, and choice of particular procedures-may be heavily influenced by malpractice
considerations.
Malpractice law seems to have undertaken to govern what would in other contexts
be contractual concerns of purchasers, perhaps because patients, as very poorly informed
consumers, must rely on their doctors and therefore need more legal protection. It is also
true that decisions on the appropriate level of risk to personal safety are less central to
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beneficial development of alternative methods to achieve similar
results.
In the case of medical malpractice, the standards are those for
selecting the medical inputs and processes to be used (whose contri-
bution to risk reduction is not always clear), and their appropriateness,
unlike that of other negligence standards, is not usually subject to inde-
pendent judicial scrutiny. Many medical practices, of course, are of es-
tablished efficacy, achieving undoubtedly valuable reductions in risk at
reasonable cost.79 In fact, the effectiveness and value of some customary
methods may be so obvious as to take them out of the customary prac-
tice rule altogether and place them in the province of normal negli-
gence judgment by a factfinder unaided by expert testimony. Most
often, however, causation and the valuation of risk and results are
unclear; these are major reasons for adopting legal standards from
medical custom in the first place.
There is thus a real danger that customary methods and
procedures may assume a validity independent of their actual worth and
may be followed (or enforced) for their own sake. At its worst, such
a situation is what all doctors despise as "cookbook" medicine, 0 but
its effects are probably most pernicious for prepaid providers, who may
have to forego a more valuable procedure for every less valuable one
they feel obligated by malpractice law to provide. Concentration on
what procedures should be given is, of course, an important part of
medicine; and "cookbook" medicine differs only in emphasis and
degree from what might be called "textbook" medicine. The medical
custom malpractice regime, however, by focusing attention almost
the principal transaction in nonmedical cases than in the medical sphere. Thus, for
example, automobiles' capacity, style, comfort, and the like are the principal concerns of
car buyers, and the passengers' safety and appropriate level of risk are only two among
many concerns. In the provision of health care services, however, the central goal and
overriding concern is the patients' personal health and safety, so that standards of care
are of the essence.
79. This is true both of measures to reduce the basic risk of bad outcome from an
existing illness or condition and of measures to reduce the risks of the medical
intervention itself. For example, few would question the law's wisdom in calling for
doctors to treat a major infectious disease with a widely known, cheap, and effective drug
having only minor side effects. Similarly, the law may confidently require a meticulous
sponge count at the close of all surgical operations (with an exception for emergency
cases where speed is more important than avoiding post-operative complications from a
neglected sponge).
80. "Cookbook" medicine, following required procedures by rote, without exercising
independent clinical judgment, has of late been most vehemently denounced in connec-
tion with PSRO standards, see note 88 infra, rather than malpractice standards, but the
two phenomena are similar.
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exclusively on what practices are customary, instead of on what prac-
tices are desirable, contributes to the basic problem: all concerned may
lose sight of the standards' actual impacts on end results (except per-
haps the bad one in the particular lawsuit under consideration), and
innovative providers, including HMOs, may be inhibited from develop-
ing less expensive methods to achieve similar results.
Moreover, malpractice enforcement of customary practices may
act as a kind of crude ratoheting mechanism, allowing more and more
elaborate procedures to become standard, but not-or only slowly-
allowing an established procedure to fall into disuse. Without inde-
pendent judicial assessment of the effectiveness and value of the
criteria, malpractice standards can change only as customary practice
changes-and providers' customs will follow standard practice because
of malpractice fears. It is possible, in fact, that the legal imprimatur
given particular methods through malpractice litigation may encourage
providers to play "catch-up" or "keep up with the Joneses" by routinely
offering ever more ways of reducing ever smaller risks."' Whether
such behavior should be condemned for putting providers on a tread-
mill of inflationary and unneeded procedures or praised for inducing
a beneficial upward spiral of quality depends upon whether or not the
methods adopted reduce risk commensurately with the costs and other
risks they engender-and neither the medical services market nor the
judicial malpractice approach is now structured to answer that question.
The situation is not entirely bleak. Medical practice is not mono-
lithic, and the adoption by malpractice law of customary practice stand-
ards does not always lock HMOs and other providers into a "one right
way" approach to care. There are often several standard styles of
diagnosis or treatment, and the "reputable minority" exception to the
medical custom rule may legitimize them,12 allowing HMOs and others
to choose a method on their own medical and cost-effectiveness
grounds. Moreover, malpractice law does not actually compel the pro-
vision of standard services, but merely penalizes the failure to provide
them when injury is the proximate result. If a particular customary
81. Many observers think that hospitals, in particular, show a marked tendency to
acquire ever-increasing capabilities to perform medical procedures, presumably for en-
hancing institutional prestige and attracting staff physicians. Feldstein, Hospital Cost
Inflation: A Study of Nonprofit Price Dynamics, 61 Am. ECON. REv. 853 (1971);
Newhouse, Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An Economic Model of a
Hospital, 60 AM. ECON. Rav. 64 (1970). Such tendencies could only be powerfully
reinforced by potential malpractice liability for failure to perform customary procedures.
82. It is not clear, however, that the law will recognize a reputable minority's
rejecting customary practice when the rejection depends upon doubts of economic
efficiency rather than of medical efficacy.
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practice is truly ineffective, s3 not following it will cause no harm, 4 and
an HMO might safely dispense with it.
The requirement of causal connection between nonconformity and
injury is thus theoretically a major protection against the forced
adoption of relatively ineffective medical procedures by HMOs and
others. In practice, however, though adoption of customary practices
as the legal norm may not directly require their use, their mere exist-
ence, which enables plaintiffs to characterize nonconformity as negli-
gence, probably has a considerable in terrorem cautionary effect, for
several reasons. First, as a legal matter, some decisions seem to reflect
a weakening of the causation requirement, at least in serious cases."s
Second, as a practical matter, the very existence of a customary stand-
ard of practice carries a strong implication that the approved method
works. It is probably very difficult to convince a factfinder confronted
with an injury that standard treatment would not have been any more
83. Where an HMO can easily demonstrate that standard practices are useless, it
may be sure of avoiding liability for omitting them. This situation is probably rare.
More often, customary practice will have some utility, but not enough, in the HMO's
estimation, to warrant its costs. Here, an HMO might nonetheless decide not to
conform, if the price of potential liability is less than that of conformity. Such liability
may constitute an excessive penalty for nonconformity. See notes 91-98 infra and
accompanying text.
84. However, harm may nonetheless ensue from the underlying illness and be
difficult to distinguish from that allegedly due to substandard care. See generally 1
LouisELL & WiLLIAmS 8.07. Even where customary practice is completely or nearly
ineffective in reducing risks, medical providers may still comply out of fear that legal
factfinders will not be able to distinguish the bad results due to the underlying illness
from those due to omission of the customary practice. The availability of evidence of
failure to conform as a "sword" for the plaintiff may thus have a considerable impact on
providers even where causation is not clear.
85. These cases involve a failure to provide the particular procedure required by
malpractice standards or providing it too late, allegedly "causing" the injury by failing to
prevent it. For example, the court in Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.
1966), stated:
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively termi-
nated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the defendant's mouth
to raise conjectures as to the measure of the chances that he has put beyond
the possibility of realization. If there was any substantial possibility of survival
and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable. . . . Id. at 632.
See also Note, Medical Malpractice-Rejection of "But For" Test, 45 N.C.L. R.v. 799
(1967); Note, Negligence-Malpractice, supra note 34. Thus, where failure to give
standard treatment was followed by death, plaintiff need not show that decedent would
probably have lived if given the treatment, but merely that he would have had a
substantial chance of living. If extended to less serious cases, such an approach to
causation would surely motivate health care providers to do everything possible for
patients out of fear of malpractice liability. See also Clark v. United States, 402 F.2d
950 (4th Cir. 1968) (failure to perform diagnostic test to distinguish between kidney
infection and blocked ureter in a timely manner).
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effective than the noncustomary treatment,8 6 especially because in
medical cases causation is often not clear-cut. By definition, moreover,
customary practice will have numerous adherents, some doubtless ready
to testify to its utility, even if it is only marginal: otherwise, they would
not use it. Third, so long as following customary practice is an almost
certain defense to malpractice suits, 2 providers' strong desire to avoid
any brush with litigation will lead them to conform, regardless of their
own evaluations of the practice's merits.88 Certainly, where fee-for-
86. As Curran notes, "It is axiomatic that a bad result is not in itself proof of
negligence, yet it comes close to it at times." Curran, Professional Negligence-Some
General Comments, 12 VAND. L. 11v. 535, 541 (1959). Further, if a plaintiff can
succeed in categorizing departure from customary practice as "experimentation," recov-
ery will be almost automatic because of the old rule that "a doctor experiments at his
peril" (unless informed consent is obtained). See, e.g., Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860
(K.B. 1767); Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), rev'd on other
grounds, 50 N.Y. 696 (1872). Of course, a defendant will simultaneously seek to show
that the noncustomary practice was a proven technique of a reputable minority.
87. See notes 24-26 supra. In a few cases, courts have looked beyond customary
practice, making an independent negligence determination. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey,
83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). This may or may not evidence a trend. See
Note, Comparative Approaches, supra note 49, at 1149 n.44.
88. The availability of the customary practice defense as a shield may be a more
important incentive for conformity than the threat of the standard as a sword. This
incentive is particularly strong because avoiding litigation, with its attendant bad
publicity, personal trauma, and great inconvenience, may be even more important to
physicians than the successful defense of a lawsuit once begun, since almost all damages
are typically paid by malpractice insurance. The strength of the "shield" effect is
apparent from the controversy surrounding the "civil immunity" clause of the PSRO
legislation, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (Supp. II, 1972), which purports to protect doctors
acting in conformity with PSRO norms from malpractice liability. Comment, PSRO:
Malpractice Liability and the Impact of the Civil Immunity Clause, 62 GEo. L.L 1499,
1505-07 (1974); Note, Professional Standards Review and the Limitation of Health
Services: An Interpretation of the Effect of Statutory Immunity on Medical Malpractice
Liability, 54 BosToN U.L. 1Ev. 931 (1974); Note, Federally Imposed Self-Regulation of
Medical Practice: A Critique of the Professional Standards Review Organization, 42
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 822, 837-42 (1974).
The AMA opposes the civil immunity provision because it "could have the unintend-
ed and undesirable effect of pressuring practitioners to adhere to the [PSRO] norms."
AMA Council on Legislation, PSRO Amendments 2 (May 1, 1974). The controversy
heated up in January, 1975, when Caspar Weinberger, then Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, whose department is the home of the PSRO program, called for
compliance with PSRO norms to be accepted "as a real defense to a malpractice suit
." Malpractice Insurance Denials Spark Weinbergefs Concern, PSRO LETTER,
Jan. 15, 1975, at 3-4. AMA President Malcolm Todd, M.D., vehemently opposed even
such use of PSRO norms, ostensibly because it would "reduce medicine and medical
practice to a 'cookbook' approach . . . ." Am. Med. News, Jan. 13, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
See also id. at 4, col. 3. (The AMA supports amendments to eliminate the offending
provision. See, e.g., Statement of the AMA, Hearings on H.R. 5515 & 5528 Before the
Subcomm. on Health, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept.
19, 1975).) The "cookbook" problem, however, is inherent in the PSRO concept, regard-
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service insurance will pay for services or precautions of questionable
risk-reducing utility, they are likely to be provided in order to comply
with customary practice standards, becoming in the process more
thoroughly established than ever and creating even larger pressures for
conformity. HMOs, having no such outside insurer to pay for custo-
mary services, might be expected to resist more strongly the malpractice
pressure to provide them,8 9 but enforcement of customary practice as
the legal standard nonetheless probably exerts a profound influence on
every phase of the health care enterprise of FIMOs90 (and other innova-
tive providers).
C. Potentially Excessive Penalties for Noncustomary Care
Malpractice law, after adopting standards to reflect the optimal
level of risk, must correctly motivate potential tortfeasors to meet those
standards by penalizing those whose conduct would otherwise unaccept-
ably increase risk. Tort law seeks to achieve this by requiring those
whose conduct is deemed unduly risky to pay for all injuries caused
that could reasonably have been avoided, requiring no compensation
for injuries resulting from acceptably risky behavior. In the malprac-
tice sphere the strong emphasis on compliance with customary practice
and the difficulty of the causation issues may easily combine to create
an excessive penalty for noncustomary behavior, like that of IMOs.
The danger is that nonstandard practice may be assessed for damages
that would not have been averted by adherence to custom.
less of PSRO norms' impact on malpractice. Since the AMA grudgingly accepts the
PSRO program itself, see, e.g., AMA, A Summary of AMA's Policy on PSRO, in PSRO
Information Kit (Oct. 1974), the real objection seems to be that clearly making PSRO
norms a malpractice shield would more effectively motivate conformity than the PSROs'
own sanctions could. Malpractice law would also apply the norms more broadly than
would PSROs' own supervision of medicare and medicaid care.
89. One study's HMO interviews, however, found that HMOs are just as likely as
other providers to practice "defensive" medicine. Curran & Moseley, supra note 34, at
85. This finding tends to support the proposition that customary practice malpractice
standards considerably disrupt HMO incentives to devote their limited resources to the
medically most effective uses, but it may also reflect, to some extent, other professional
influences. These influences are difficult to distinguish from the impact of malpractice
law, since the legal standard itself is largely derived from medical custom.
90. It would seem, however, that FMC HMOs-almost by definition-could not be
shown to deviate from customary practice, since FMCs typically utilize most or all
physicians in a county medical society. (PGP HMOs, in contrast, use small physician
panels.) See note 3 supra. Nonetheless, FMCs may prescribe methods somewhat
different from the same doctors' customary fee-for-service practice. The first malprac-
tice case to consider the application of the medical custom rule to such circumstances
should make interesting reading.
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The all-or-nothing rule of compensation works well where legal
factfinders are capable of assessing an activity's level of risk and can
easily judge whether unreasonable behavior caused the particular injury
at issue. In most cases, we feel comfortably able to distinguish harm
caused by failure to take justified safety measures from harm which
would have occurred despite all reasonable precautions. Questions of
medical causation, however, may often be a matter of probabilities and
not clear-cut, making it difficult to distinguish injury caused by noncus-
tomary practice from that which would have occurred anyway.9 1
If a noncustomary practice at issue in a malpractice suit can be
shown by expert testimony to reduce risk below customary levels, ensu-
ing injuries should not be compensated; this result could be achieved
either by finding a lack of proximate cause or by holding the noncus-
tomary practice non-negligent as a "reputable minority" practice.92
The classic dilemma of noncustomary behavior, however, is posed by
an increased risk of bad results knowingly undertaken in exchange for
other benefits-for example, further improving the results in successful
cases, increasing comfort, or saving money to spend on reducing other
risks or to return to patients. This is exactly the sort of behavior likely
to be engendered by IMOs' efficiency incentives. 98
Unfortunately, malpractice law does not now and probably cannot
structure appropriate financial incentives to deal solely with increased
risk accompanying noncustomary behavior. For example, even the
most highly trained, board-certified anesthesiologist can expect a cer-
tain mortality rate in connection with a particular operation-perhaps
91. See, e.g., 1 LOUiSELL & WiLLiAMs 8.07. Clearly, cases involving alleged
failure to provide certain care-the cases with which this Article is primarily concerned
-are more difficult in this respect than are cases involving alleged injury from the medi-
cal care provided.
92. A showing that a noncustomary procedure is just as effective in reducing risks to
patients as is customary procedure would satisfy the essence of the requirement that a
minority practice be "reputable" to be accepted. Such objective evidence is certainly
preferable to subjective consideration of whether practitioners using non-standard proce-
dure have good reputations, but may be difficult and expensive to develop.
93. How characteristic of HMOs this behavior actually is depends upon how
resistant HMO subscribers are to price increases and upon how much other factors,
including malpractice concerns, counterbalance HMOs' natural cost-counting incentives.
See note 89 supra. HMOs would wish to alter the pattern of care established by
malpractice standards only if their valuations of the costs, risks, and results were
different from those implicit in the standards. By hypothesis, negligence standards that
accurately reflect social valuations could not be improved upon, though this Article has
argued that customary practice does not in fact make such correct valuations. See notes
67-76 supra and accompanying text. Whether an HMO and its subscribers nonetheless
ought to be able knowingly to choose a different level of care from the hypothetical
social optimum is discussed at note 119 infra and accompanying text.
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one tenth of one percent. If such personnel are generally available
and surgeons utilize their services for most of those operations in the
relevant locality, their level of training may well set the standard of
care, and those deaths will be uncompensated. Personnel with less
training might well experience a higher rate, perhaps two tenths of one
percent. Using the less-trained personnel might constitute negli-
gence,94 but not all those thereby injured should be compensated.
Noncustomary practice in this case by hypothesis causes one extra death
per thousand procedures, but may cause two lawsuits. The problem
cannot be approached as one of the negligence standard itself, since
by definition breach of custom is malpractice. It must be seen as a
problem of causation and damages, which is unfortunate because of the
all-or-nothing rule of damages and the lack of an acceptable means of
determining which of the two potential plaintiffs was injured by devia-
tion from accepted practice. No middle ground is now available to
reflect suoh uncertainty as to causation, since compromise verdicts are
unlawful.
As a practical matter, it is quite likely that the hypothetical
nonstandard practice would be condemned by a jury in both cases, if
there were undisputed breach of the customary practice, testimony as
to the general efficacy of the customary practice, and clear injury.95 As
a matter of law, the problem of the uncertain plaintiff injured by
increased risk might seem to be covered by the rule denying recovery
where it could be predicated only on the factfinder's speculation as to
which of two causes was responsible for an injury.90 Neither result is
satisfactory; what is needed is a financial incentive related to incremen-
tal risk, which cannot be provided through the case-by-case approach
of malpractice law under normal tort procedures.
One analogy does suggest itself, though it is doubtful that it could
be applied, namely, tailoring compensation to degree of culpability, as
in apportionment of damages among defendants according to degree
of fault 97 or in reduction of damages according to the comparative negli-
gence of the plaintiff.9" Legislation along these lines would provide
94. In Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967), for example,
the Supreme Court of Washington found a hospital liable for allowing an unsupervised
dentist, rather than a doctor, to administer general anesthesia.
95. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Schulz v. Feigal, 273 Minn. 470, 476, 142 N.W.2d 84, 89 (1966).
97. UNwoanv CoNTRmuTIoN AmoNG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1; PRossER § 50; Note,
Adjusting Losses Among Joint Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE L.J.
964, 981-84 (1959).
98. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (Supp. 1975); Abraham & Riddle, Comparative
Negligence-A New Horizon, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 411 (1973).
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a theoretically valid solution, but the same problems of accurate judicial
assessment of risk which underlie the medical custom rule would
probably make such an approach impractical.
D. Unduly Narrow Focus on the Risks of Individual Procedures
A major virtue of the t{MO concept is the great control each HMO
has over the allocation of all health care resources for a given popula-
tion.9 That control theoretically enables an HMO to undertake the
optimum amount of risk reduction in each and every medical area, thus
maximizing the aggregate health of the HMO population by equalizing
the marginal value of risk averted in each area.100 In particular, an
HMO can theoretically fund the proper amounts of preventive and
acute care, pre-operative and post-operative treatment, diagnostic and
therapeutic procedures, care for one type of condition or illness and
care for another, and so on, throughout the entire medical spectrum.
Perhaps the most fundamental objection to application of the current
malpractice approach to HI-O care is that its case-by-case setting of
standards-largely reflecting fee-for-service practice-interferes with
this great potential of HMOs to adjust the standards of care in one area
to accommodate those in another. Malpractice law's enforcement of
customary practice does not recognize the relevance of risks in any area
other than the one being litigated.
In the course of one treatment a single patient may undergo
diagnosis, surgery, post-operative hospital care, and follow-up treat-
ment. In the fee-for-service sector each phase of this care may well
be undertaken by a separate provider (or combination of providers),
and each phase will be governed by a standard of care set independ-
ently of the others. The practices of anesthesiologists set the anes-
thesia standard, those of surgeons the surgery standard, and those of
other specialists the standards in their respective fields-but there is
no incentive to determine whether some of the resources devoted to
99. Highly integrated and comprehensive PGPs obviously have more control over
resource allocation than do FMCs, whose providers use independently owned and
operated facilities. See also note 3 supra.
100. Theoretically, HMO subscribers would be best served if the last dollar spent on
each action achieved the same value of health; otherwise, adjusting expenditures from
less to more productive areas could improve subscriber health at no additional cost. Some
health-promoting expenditures are directly or indirectly governed by malpractice stan-
dards; others are not. Within the medical areas affected by malpractice law, there is
also room for adjusting expenditures according to which are most cost-effective in
reducing risks. It is this type of adjustment which HMOs may be impeded from making
by malpractice norms set in the fee-for-service sector, where such re-allocations of
resources are usually far more difficult, if not impossible, to make.
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careful surgery might be better spent, for instance, on more nurses.
Malpractice law will set and enforce each of these standards sepa-
rately. 10 1 This means that very different levels of care can and do pre-
vail in different areas.10 2  An HMO, responsible for all care, has the
capability to gather adequate data, evaluate the findings, and take ap-
propriate precautions at each stage of care, according to the costs,
values, and risks throughout diagnosis and treatment, and also has the
incentive and ability to shift resources from one area to another if simi-
lar overall risks can be achieved at less cost. This ideal resource-allo-
cation process may be extraordinarily difficult to achieve in practice be-
cause of limited knowledge and high costs of data-gathering, imple-
mentation, and the like. But the potential is there, and HMOs' unique
capabilities and incentives in this regard could be nullified by requiring
them to follow the patterns of risk-reducing measures established by
very different fee-for-service practice.
An even more basic task than harmonizing the standards for
different phases of one type of care is balancing the risk-reducing worth
of care for different illnesses and of preventive versus acute care.
Which is more important: very highly qualified surgeons or more resi-
dents in the emergency room; screening for birth defects or treating
middle-aged hypertension? Fee-for-service medicine cannot effec-
tively address such questions, since these issues are not encompassed
within the jurisdiction of any decision-maker who controls, provides, or
finances care. Nor can malpractice litigation, concentrating on a par-
ticular kind of bad result in an individual case, offer much guidance
in this important social area; the judicial process is inadequate for con-
sideration of such broad resource-allocation issues. It may not be too
much to ask of malpractice law, however, that it refrain from enforcing
standards which effectively deter HMOs from achieving whatever
progress in this area is feasible within the state of the medical art.
101. This is not meant to imply that the law of malpractice will actually govern all
medical actions. Malpractice standards can best deal with the most straightforward
medical cases; where particular services are not clearly and directly related to individual
bad results, malpractice is a poor enforcement tool. Many risk-reducing measures may
be seen statistically to improve results without their omission's being demonstrably
related to particular bad results. For example, clean hospital corridors might be very
important for quick recovery of patients, but the problems of proving that filthy ones
caused harm would normally be insuperable.
102. In fact, some authorities think that simple measures to coordinate the fragment-
ed approach to health care within large hospitals may be the most valuable contribution
to overall risk reduction that can now be easily made-at very little cost compared with
using much more highly qualified practitioners or expensive diagnostic or treatment
procedures to reduce risks. AssuRmNo QuALrrY OF HEALTH CARE, supra note 7, at 63.
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A PROVISIONAL SOLUTION WITHIN THE CUSTOMARY APPROACH: iMO
CUSTOM AS THE STANDARD OF CARE
Both fairness and socially appropriate risk reduction would be
served by independent assessments of fee-for-service and HMO care
by the same standards of reasonableness, with full judicial cognizance
of the importance of costs.' 0 3 Instead, the law must rely upon medical
custom to set standards: despite numerous theoretical and practical
objections, no workable replacement for this approach seems likely to
emerge in the foreseeable future. Under these circumstances, it seems
desirable to insulate liMOs from having to follow the custom of a very
differently organized system of medical care. There is one way to
recognize the legitimacy of HMO practices in the absence of independ-
ent judicial assessment of each noncustomary practice. The law could
103. Judicial evenhandedness and full social consideration of costs in standard-setting
could be achieved by well-informed judicial evaluation of negligence, and there is some
indication that courts may be turning away from a strict customary practice approach to
malpractice. Note, Evaluation of Change, supra note 24, at 745-47; Note, Comparative
Approaches, supra note 49, at 1149 n.44. In Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519
P.2d 981 (1974), for example, the Supreme Court of Washington held the failure to
administer a particular diagnostic test negligent as a matter of law, in spite of undisputed
evidence of customary practice to the contrary. The court seemed to reason that a
pressure test for glaucoma should be routinely given to all ophthalmological patients
because of the seriousness of glaucoma-induced loss of sight and the small expense and
low risk of the test itself. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
In this case, however, custom may well have correctly assessed the costs and risks in
not administering the test to people under forty because of the rarity of glaucoma before
that age. See Note, Comparative Approaches, supra note 49, at 1149 n.38. The Helling
court, however, took no account of the magnitude of the risk sought to be reduced,
which, for the plaintiff in her late twenties, was less than one in 25,000. The plaintiff
had a history of repeated vision problems, however, 83 Wash. 2d at 515-16, 519 P.2d at
981, and the court might have limited its holding by placing her in a higher-risk category
to which different customary standards might have applied, id. at 517-18, 519 P.2d at
982. Instead, the holding effectively requires ophthalmologists to omit the test at their
peril, and 25,000 patients will have to pay for the diagnosis of a single illness. The
concurring opinion, id. at 520, 519 P.2d at 984, correctly noted that this result in fact
closely resembles a strict or absolute liability approach-but following the new custom-
ary practice set out by the court will immunize providers and prevent compensation to
the injured (in the likely event that the test is not 100 percent foolproof), so that neither
optimal deterrence nor full compensation is achieved. If Helling is typical of independ-
ent judicial assessment of negligence, HMOs and other providers would be better off
without it.
A more rigorous negligence assessment should be possible, and the growing litera-
ture of medical cost-benefit analysis, especially of diagnostic tests, may facilitate this in
the future. See, e.g., Mass. Dep't of Public Health, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Newborn
Screening for Metabolic Disorders, 291 NEw ENG. J. Mm. 1414 (1974) (finds screening
cost-justified; but note failure to discount future savings to present value); Neuhauser &
Lewicki, What Do We Gain from the Sixth Stool Guaiac?, 293 NEW ENG. J. Mw. 226
(1975).
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accept HMO custom as determinative of due care, to the same extent
that insured fee-for-service custom is now accepted, in effect allowing
this subgroup of medical practitioners to set its own malpractice stand-
ards. Whether or not a particular IMO practice was negligent would
thus be judged by the practice of other FIMO providers under compa-
rable circumstances.' 04
Such a solution may at first blush seem radical, since it would in
some cases accept as appropriate two different standards of care-
HMO and fee-for-service-for a single treatment or diagnosis. In
many cases, however, the standards would probably be nearly identical
because of widespread agreement on the worth of particular practices.
Moreover, the differences in standards would not necessarily reflect dif-
ferent levels of risk reduction, but often only variations in the style of
achieving a similar risk of bad outcomes. 0 5
Actually, it is not so surprising that different medical standards
should be accepted as appropriate, given the uncertainties inherent in
much medical care and the inability of malpractice law to evaluate most
medical risks and the risk-reducing or -enhancing effects of different
standards. After all, it is these factors which have led to reliance on
market-oriented standards in place of judicial judgment. Malpractice
law formerly accepted the coexistence of a great variety of health care
practices in the medical marketplace-each "school of practice" had its
own practitioners, standards, and prices-and judged each case by the
custom of the school of treatment of the health care provider elected
by the patient. 0 Malpractice law today, while it holds all providers
to certain minimum requirements,' 0 accepts multiple standards where
noncustomary practice is supported by a "reputable minority" of practi-
104. Courts should, nevertheless, continue to examine HMO customary practice for
reasonableness whenever judicial assessment is feasible, see note 103 supra, to the same
extent that fee-for-service custom is also scrutinized.
105. HMOs offer good quality care, comparing favorably with that of providers in
general. See note 12 supra.
106. E.g., Klimkiewicz v. Karnick, 150 Colo. 267, 372 P.2d 736 (1962) (chiroprac-
tor); Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 A. 1116 (1893) (homeopath). The "school of
practice" doctrine has faded somewhat as modem allopathic medicine has come to be
accepted as the only scientifically valid school, and both licensure and malpractice law
reflect this. Other "schools" have adopted medical tenets, like osteopathy, or accepted
limited scopes of practice, like chiropractic. A nonmedical doctor or health care
practitioner will be judged by the standards of medical doctors if the care given
constitutes medical practice. E.g., HoLDER 44. The "school" approach has merged into
the similar "reputable minority" approach, but now usually covers minority opinion
among medical doctors. Spiritualists, magnetic healers, and the like do not constitute
reputable minorities. PRossER 163.
107. PROSSER 163.
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tioners on the ground that it is just as effective medically as majority
practice. 108 Furthermore, there is precedent for dual standards of care,
on economic as well as medical grounds, in the different standards ap-
plied to specialists and general practitioners 0 9 and in the rationale
underlying the locality rule.110
An HMO custom rule would be broader than the current "repu-
108. See authorities cited at note 28 supra. This doctrine is not well suited for
examining the legitimacy of all noncustomary HMO practice, however. It is normally
applied where there is a medical disagreement on the risk-reducing effectiveness of
different procedures, as where one group of surgeons favors on medical grounds one
operation and another a different operation. The difficult HMO case, in contrast, arises
from a noncustomary HMO valuation of agreed-upon medical facts. The doctrine is also
applied on a procedure-by-procedure basis, which would complicate consideration of the
likely HMO rationale-that a given procedure is not provided because another is more
valuable.
109. Medical specialists and general practitioners coexist, providing services which
frequently overlap, but under markedly different malpractice standards of care. The
performance of specialists is measured by the standards of fellow specialists. Those
standards are higher than those of doctors generally, and may be national rather than
local. See note 27 supra. Malpractice law thus accepts at least two different standards,
with different economic antecedents and consequences, for identical procedures. The
patient's choice of provider will determine the standard of care he receives. The
ostensible rationale for a higher specialist standard is that specialists hold themselves out
as more than ordinarily qualified. Belk v. Schweizer, 268 N.C. 50, 56, 149 S.E.2d 565,
569 (1966); 1 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS 8.04 n.60. Lurking in the background, though
not seen as crucial, is the fact that specialists typically are paid considerably higher fees,
a factor which surely has some bearing on their ability to maintain a higher standard.
That patients may choose a GP's lower standard of care, perhaps for reasons of lower
cost, lends some support to the notion that separate HMO standards, resulting largely
from cost considerations, are appropriate.
110. The locality rule, as traditionally applied, reflects a very real concern for the
costs of achieving particular standards of care, though the rule is not usually discussed in
those terms. Normally, the application of different standards in different localities is
explained by the great variation among regions in the availability of facilities, personnel,
and continuing education. Isolated practitioners, for example, have been thought unable
to keep abreast of developments in medicine elsewhere. HoLDER 53-54; McCoid 569-70.
Such differences are not due to an absolute impossibility of meeting higher standards, but
rather in large measure can be explained as a matter of cost. The most backward area
could, after all, allow its doctors six months of the year to train at some advanced
medical center, or achieve a very high standard of care, except perhaps in cases of the
utmost emergency, by simply providing helicopter service to the Mayo Clinic. Nonethe-
less, the locality rule retains, and it is important that it does, an implied recognition that
different costs may dictate different medical malpractice standards.
So analyzed, the locality rule supports the legitimacy of weighing costs in setting
standards for HMOs, but a separate IMO standard is not strictly analogous to separate
rural standards. HIMOs, like rural areas, are apt to balk at the cost of meeting some
customary malpractice standards, but, unlike rural areas, not because of the practical
impossibility of raising the cash. The reason, instead, is a different valuation of the
worth of the standard. Moreover, people are more apt to have considered what standard
of care they will receive when joining an HMO than when moving to a rural area.
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table minority" doctrine,'11 but narrower than a "school of practice"
rule accepting completely different philosophies of medical care." 2
Allowing HMO custom to set negligence standards would be a recogni-
tion that, theoretically, LMO risk-reducing incentives are just as
appropriate as those of fee-for-service providers for judging the social
value of particular care, and that, empirically, the quality record of
HMOs is excellent. 1 3  In taking market-derived standards as its own,
malpractice law would recognize the existence of two equally valid mar-
keting approaches in the provision of health care. It is true that the
economizing incentives of HMOs could lead some of them to "under-
reduce" some medical risks. There is nothing to indicate, however, that
such incentives would be greater than the incentives which cause over-
spending in the fee-for-service context in attempts to eliminate risks."14
Moreover, to create separate and potentially different HMO
standards is not to allow HMOs to exist in a vacuum. Insured fee-for-
service is the dominant mode of practice, and dissatisfied HMO
enrollees can change to other providers and conventional insurance cov-
erage."15 HMOs thus feel constant competitive pressure to perform as
well as fee-for-service providers." 6 The reverse is seldom the case,
since HMO care is not a competitive force in most areas. Furthermore,
HMO physicians are educated at the same medical schools as other doc-
tors, read the same journals, join the same professional organizations,
and are presumably equally humane and desirous of helping their
patients-factors which constitute extremely important protection
against HMO corner-cutting in evaluating and acting to reduce medical
risks. Further, HMO patients (and their relatives) are probably just
as demanding of high-quality, low-risk care for a given illness as are
others and may be more capable of detecting underservice than others
111. The HMO custom rule would apply across the board to all HMOs, not merely
procedure by procedure like the reputable minority doctrine. It would also encompass
noncustomary practice based upon evaluative disagreements with majority practice, not
merely upon differences of opinion over medical effectiveness.
112. HMO divergences from majority custom would be acceptable because of differ-
ent evaluations and style differences in applying similar methods, but not because of
fundamentally conflicting philosophies of healing methods.
113. See generally authorities cited in note 12 supra.
114. Overeconomizing, moreover, would not be universal among HMOs, and the
general level of care would set the standard.
115. Many HMOs follow a "dual choice" policy. See, e.g., Phelan, Erickson &
Fleming, supra note 3, at 799-800. Dual choice is also embodied as federal policy in the
IMO Act of 1973. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9 (Supp. HI 1973).
116. Lack of subscriber-patient knowledge and understanding may, however, limit
competition's effects.
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are of resisting overservice."17 Finally, the integration of services and
the centralization of many important medical decisions inherent in the
HMO concept enable subscribers to wield substantial influence through
grievance procedures, consumer participation on policy boards, and the
like." 8 Such efforts are far more difficult in the more fragmented fee-
for-service sector, where each hospital, clinic, or medical partnership
is independent. Such consumer inputs are imperfect substitutes for
well-informed individual patient or subscriber choice, but they are
superior to the alternative of nearly total physician discretion in medi-
cal decision-making, which creates the customary practice now enforced
by malpractice law.
An HMO custom rule would increase emphasis on subscriber
choices-and willingness to pay-as determinants of the socially ac-
ceptable level of risk in IMO care.119 It would also shift the perspec-
tive of decision-making somewhat away from individual illnesses or
crises, the management of which sets the current standard, and toward
the more dispassionate focus of a health subscriber's evaluation of
hazards from all health-threatening conditions. To the extent that the
rationale for a market-oriented negligence standard rests on the
assumption that medical custom represents both physician and "cus-
tomer" views, this is an appropriate shift. To the extent that the medi-
cal custom standard simply accepts aggregate physician judgment in
lieu of a social judgment on risks, the HMO custom rule would substi-
tute physician judgment constrained by cost considerations for largely
unconstrained physician judgment. Finally, a separate I-IMO custom
standard would permit use of different standards as a kind of social
117. HMO or insured patients face little cost for extra service and are apt to demand
more services rather than less-at least to the extent that they know about possible risk-
reducing measures their doctors might provide.
118. See Starr, The Undelivered Health System, 42 Pun. INTEREST 66, 81-84 (1976).
119. The extent to which agreements on risk reduction between provider and patient
or enrollee ought to influence or supersede malpractice standards is an important,
difficult, and seldom considered question. Particular medical measures, even if more
than normally risky, are acceptable where a patient knowledgeably assumes the risk or
gives informed consent. More difficult is the case of an HMO which might offer a
higher level of risk in medical care in exchange for lower premiums. Here, subscribers,
though they could not know in advance exactly what risks are at stake, could rationally
choose the general level of care they wish, from Volkswagen to Mercedes, and general
regulation could keep quality of care above acceptable minimums. Havighurst &
Bovbjerg, supra note 19, at 415-16. Thoroughgoing malpractice specification of what
care is appropriate obviously would inhibit the making of such choices. Our society
generally allows free consumer choice between Volkswagens and Mercedes, without
expecting the former to be as safe as the latter, even though consumers are only very
poorly able to weigh the exact differences in safety. The law, however, intervenes much
more readily in the provision of medical care than in the sale of cars.
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experiment, perhaps ultimately generating enough information about
both fee-for-service and HMO standards for an independent judicial
assessment to be made of both of them.
The objections to an HMO custom standard mirror those against
customary practice standards generally. 12 0 Unfettered HMO discretion
in the setting of standards might be abused, given the imperfections
of patient influence on medical decision-making generally. Moreover,
established HMO practice might, through malpractice law, unduly in-
hibit others-for example, very innovative new HMOs or an entirely
new type of medical organization-from legitimate experimentation
with noncustomary methods.
In implementing the proposed HMO custom standard, courts must
set forth clearly their rationale; exactly why HMOs are a special case
must be understood or the old battle over what schools of practice are
legitimate could be reopened: if HMOs set their own standards, why
not snake-oil salesmen? Similarly, exactly what constitutes an "HMO"
eligible for different standards must be clear; the proposed rule should
not serve to legitimate the practice of any group choosing to accept pre-
payment. 12 . Judicial experience with deciding whether a given minor-
ity's practice is "reputable" might offer helpful precedent, but the
underlying theory of that doctrine is poorly articulated, and the question
of the legitimacy of HMO practice generally goes far beyond that of
whether a particular noncustomary practice is acceptable in one set of
circumstances. The questions here may be difficult and costly to
handle under established judicial procedure, as they potentially involve
the entire scope of operation of complex institutions. The locality rule
in some jurisdictions would also need modification, since there are so
few HMOs in most of the country. The law should compare the custom
of similarly situated HMOs, so as to avoid grouping together the prac-
tices of very disparate organizations, ranging from large urban conglom-
erates to small rural group clinics, which operate under very different
120. This Article has argued that HMOs are less likely than fee-for-service providers
to misevaluate risk reduction and costs, to concentrate inappropriately on process
standards, or to be subject to other problems stemming from custom-derived standards.
See notes 42-102 supra and accompanying text.
121. To borrow Prosser's comment on the "school of practice" doctrine, not any
"quack, charlatan or crackpot" should be allowed to "set himself up as" an IMO.
PRossER 163. This problem would not be so serious in the HMO case because so many
HMOs are clearly reputable and these providers would set the new HMO group's
standards of care. Nonetheless, especially where HMOs accept higher risks in one area
for the sake of lowering others, see notes 100-02 supra and accompanying text,
malpractice suits might have to examine practice in both areas, a task for which the case-
by-case judicial process is not well suited.
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resource constraints. Finally, some HMOs might resist a separate
HMO custom standard, fearing that separateness would suggest non-
equality to potential enrollees.
Nonetheless, despite theoretical and practical problems with an
"HMO custom" malpractice standard, the proposed test makes sense.
Allowing HMOs to develop different malpractice standards should help
to hold down risk-reducing costs and to maintain a healthy diversity of
approaches to medical care-a very desirable goal in an uncertain field.
CONCLUSION
It should not be expected that unleashing IMOs from the majority
medical custom rule will solve all malpractice problems or greatly ease
the intractable difficulties of deciding how much medical care is enough
and how safe it should be. It is, however, a modest step in the right
direction. The capacity of modem medicine to intervene on behalf of
human health is immense and growing rapidly, as is the capacity to
gather information in deciding whether and how to intervene. But the
ability to finance medical procedures is limited, and choices must be
made. Medical custom and the law of medical malpractice are
important influences on these choices-though perhaps less so than are
the organization and financing of health care itself. In any case, find-
ing workable approaches to these problems requires additional atten-
tion from the medical and legal communities.
It seems likely that only decision-makers motivated to face up to
the harsh fact of limited medical resources can be expected to incor-
porate cost considerations effectively into their risk-reduction calcula-
tions. In theory, patients, third-party insurers, or courts might perform
this function, but HMOs offer a unique opportunity to combine the
viewpoints of patient, insurer, and provider in determining the proper
standard of care. Policed by a malpractice rule of customary HMO
practice, and by independent judicial evaluation of standards when
feasible, such relative autonomy for HMOs might well be the best
solution achievable within the customary practice approach to mal-
practice law.
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